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Brexit	and	moral	foundation	framing:	the	key	to	a
People’s	Vote	is	in	Vote	Leave’s	hands
Will	Conservative	Brexiteers	back	another	referendum?	If	so,	is	it	the	nature	of	the
argument	that	will	persuade	them	or	who	makes	it?	Eitan	Tzelgov	and	Delia
Dumitrescu	show	that,	although	views	on	Brexit	are	based	around	moral	issues,
moral	framing	alone	does	not	persuade	these	voters.	What	does	seem	to	change
their	minds	on	a	second	referendum	are	moral	arguments	by	Vote	Leave.
Over	the	last	three	months,	calls	for	a	second	EU	referendum	have	become	more	prominent.	Indeed,	even	arch-
Brexiteers	such	as	Nigel	Farage	and	Arron	Banks	have	toyed	with	the	idea	of	a	second	vote.	Most	recently,	London
mayor	Sadiq	Khan	called	for	another	referendum,	and	the	Labour	party	conference	passed	a	motion	backing	the
possibility	of	“people’s	vote”	on	Brexit.
Amongst	voters,	opposition	to	a	second	referendum	is	strongest	among	Brexit	supporting,	Conservative	Party	voters,
who	hold	right-leaning	positions	on	immigration	and	nationalism.	However,	even	among	Brexiteers,	frustration	is
mounting	about	the	negotiations.	Thus,	although	Brexit	views	are	related	to	solidified	positions,	this	lack	of
satisfaction	can	make	a	new	referendum	an	enticing	prospect	not	just	for	Remainers,	but	for	Brexiteers	as	well.	If
that	is	the	case,	what	type	of	arguments	can	cause	conservative	Brexiteers	to	change	their	position?		Second,	which
political	actors—in	a	political	system	so	split	over	Brexit—can	persuade	them?
In	new	research,	we	use	the	case	of	the	second	referendum	to	test	the	limits	of	cue-taking,	framing	and	persuasion
effects,	and	the	explanatory	power	of	Moral	Foundations	Theory	(MF).	Since	the	Brexit	debate	has	been	framed
around	moral	issues	such	as	rightful	authority	and	control,	we	examine	the	second	referendum	through	the	lens	of
moral	framing.	On	the	one	hand,	moral	underpinnings	may	render	the	position	on	Brexit	difficult	to	change.	However,
work	in	social	psychology,	based	on	MF	theory,	suggests	that	strongly	held	attitudes	can	change	when	people
encounter	messages	using	moral-based	arguments.
In	addition,	since	partisan	endorsements	are	important	heuristics	individuals	use	in	political	decisions-making,	we	are
also	interested	in	their	persuasion	effects.	Partisan	endorsements	are	generally	very	strong.	However,	when	the
party	is	divided,	the	impact	of	partisan	endorsement	may	be	diminished.	Given	the	‘civil	war’	amongst	the	Tories,	can
the	party	still	provide	voters	with	cues?	And,	if	cohesion	matters	for	cue-taking,	what	about	non-parliamentary,	more
cohesive	groups,	like	Vote	Leave?	The	Brexit	issue	allows,	therefore,	for	a	rare	examination	of	the	comparative
power	of	endorsements	coming	from	two	different	sources:	an	internally-divided	party,	and	a	cross-partisan,	yet
ideologically	united	pressure	group.
The	study	was	designed	to	answer	a	number	of	specific	questions.	First,	we	wanted	to	test	whether	the	issue	of
Brexit	is	grounded	in	moral	values.	Second,	if	that	were	the	case,	we	were	curious	to	learn	whether	the	type	of	frame
used	in	an	argument	in	favour	of	a	people’s	vote	mattered;	specifically,	is	an	argument	framed	around	a	conservative
moral	frame	more	persuasive	in	the	eyes	of	Conservatives?	Third,	we	were	interested	in	the	‘messenger’	effect;	are
cohesive	political	organizations	more	persuasive	than	divided	ones?	And	finally,	we	wanted	to	see	whether	there
were	‘amplification’	effects,	whereby	morally	based	arguments	advocated	by	cohesive	political	actors	became	more
appealing	to	Conservative	voters.
The	first	study	was	conducted	on	April	2018,	and	tests	whether—as	predicted	by	MF	theory—British	conservatives
and	liberals	use	different	moral	underpinnings	to	justify	their	Brexit	vote	(N=608).	Our	quantitative	analysis	of	survey
respondents’	answers	relied	on	Linguistic	Inquiry	word	Count		and	used	the	Moral	Foundations	dictionary.	The
analysis	indicated	that	Conservative	respondents	use	a	distinct	morally	based	language.	Specifically,	right	leaning
positions	on	the	left-right	scale,	and	positions	on	specific	social	issues	are	correlated	with	the	use	of	authority
(N=527).	Our	reading	of	conservative	respondents’	answers	reveals	that	in	the	context	of	the	authority	moral
foundation,	they	use	themes	such	as	preference	for	national	law-making	and	border	controls.
At	the	next	stage,	we	tested	the	persuasive	power	of	moral	arguments,	as	well	as	the	importance	of	the	endorsement
source.	We	conducted	an	experiment	employing	a	fully-randomized	experimental	design,	whereby	participants	were
randomly	assigned	to	one	of	the	six	experimental	groups.
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We	crafted	two	arguments,	presenting	different	rationalizations	for	having	a	second	referendum.	The	MF,	authority-
based	argument,	presented	the	vote	as	an	instrument	that	would	restore	the	authority	of	the	British	people.	It	was
justified	as	a	solution	to	the	lack	of	accountability	in	the	Brexit	negotiations,	and	the	reluctance	of	politicians	to	deliver
on	the	result	of	the	first	referendum.	Conversely,	the	information-based	argument	highlighted	the	political	stalemate
in	parliament,	and	presented	the	second	referendum	as	a	way	out	of	that	situation.	Manipulation	tests	ensured	that
the	arguments	were	similar	in	terms	of	length,	linguistic	complexity,	grammatical	choices,	and	use	of	MF	language.
The	experiment	was	conducted	from	July	26th	to	July	30th.	630	ideologically	conservative	respondents,	who	had
voted	for	the	Conservative	Party	in	2017,	and	for	Brexit	in	2016,	were	recruited	via	the	Prolific	platform,	and
randomly	assigned	to	one	of	the	six	experimental	conditions.	After	reading	the	argument	they	were	asked	to	estimate
how	appealing/persuasive	the	messages	would	be	to	Leave	voters.	We	then	regressed	their	answers	on	the	various
experimental	conditions,	and	adjusted	the	average	treatment	effects	by	education,	work	status,	sex,	and	age
(N=585).
In	Figure	1	we	examine	the	persuasive	effects	of	the	MF-authority	argument	relative	to	the	informative	one,	when
neither	is	sponsored	by	a	political	actor.	As	can	be	seen,	the	persuasion/appeal	effect	is	not	statistically	significant	in
either	of	the	models.	Thus,	in	the	case	of	Brexit,	morally-framed	arguments	do	not	seem	to	be	especially	convincing.
Figure	1:	Average	treatment	effect	of	the	moral	(authority)	argument
How	does	the	identity	of	the	messenger	affect	appeal/persuasion	levels?	The	answer	to	this	question	is	presented	in
Figure	2.	The	figure	displays	the	average	treatment	effect	for	an	informative	message,	sponsored	by	a	political	actor,
relative	to	an	unsponsored	informative	message.	The	results	indicate	that	sponsorship	by	Conservative	Party
members	is	not	more	persuasive	at	all.	In	contrast,	simply	adding	a	Vote	Leave	sponsorship	to	an	informative	call	for
a	second	referendum	causes	the	messages	to	be	significantly	more	appealing/persuasive	to	Leave	voters.
Figure	2:	Average	effect	of	message	sponsors
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Does	a	morally-framed	argument	become	more	persuasive	if	sponsored	by	a	cohesive	actor	as	well?	The	answer	is
yes.	In	Figure	3,	we	present	the	average	predicted	levels	of	persuasion/appeal,	conditional	on	the	message	sponsor.
While	Vote	Leave	sponsorship	significantly	increases	these	levels	among	Leave	voters,	a	sponsorship	by
Conservative	Party	members	has	virtually	no	effect.
Figure	3:	Persuasion/Appeal	average	predicted	values
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Brexit and moral foundation framing: the key to a People’s Vote is in Vote Leave’s hands Page 3 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-09-27
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/brexit-and-moral-foundation-framing/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
The	results	are	interesting	for	political	scientists,	as	they	indicate	that	old	style	politics,	of	the	sort	established	by
Campbel	et	al,	may	not	be	as	important	as	in	the	past.	In	times	where	one-issue,	cohesive,	extreme	political
movements	set	the	tone	on	major	political	issues,	we	may	need	to	refine	our	understanding	of	cue-taking	and	party-
driven	motivated	reasoning.
In	terms	of	implications	for	British	politics,	the	findings	show	that	certain	moral	frames	are	pervasive	in	the	way	voters
conceive	of	Brexit,	which	may	explain	the	high	levels	of	polarization	over	the	issue.	Interestingly,	even	though	we	find
that	Brexit	positions	are	morally	based,	we	fail	to	replicate	persuasion	effects	from	the	MF	literature;	moral	framing
alone	does	not	lead	to	persuasion.	It	could	be	that	Brexit	positions	have	become	so	entrenched	that	they	cannot	be
altered	by	a	simple,	one-off	treatment.
As	for	party	politics,	the	results	mirror	the	Conservative	Party’s	disarray	over	Brexit.	The	party	is	not	seen	as	a	leader
on	the	matter,	as	is	evident	from	the	lack	of	any	persuasion	effects	in	cases	where	it	sponsors	a	call	for	a
referendum.	In	our	experiment,	Vote	Leave,	a	pro-Brexit,	cross-party	organization—which	hasn’t	even	been	active
since	the	referendum—has	taken	the	party’s	place	in	terms	of	leading	voters	to	rethink	their	position.	Whether	this
has	any	relevance	to	the	likelihood	of	a	people’s	vote	only	time	will	tell.	Ironically,	the	keys	to	holding	another
referendum	in	the	near	future	may	in	fact	be	in	the	hands	of	those	who	advocated	for	a	clean	break	in	the	first	place,
Vote	Leave.
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